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Upstream or Downstream Information Sharing ?*
Svend Albaek 




In a price-setting vertically separated duopoly model l analyse, whether the 
manufacturers will share private demand information themselves, or will leave this to 
their retailers. In a vertically integrated price-setting duopoly with private demand 
information, the firms will benefit, from committing, before they receive their private 
demand signals, to pool this information with their rival. Taking this as a starting 
point, the question asked in this paper is whether the manufacturers, who receive the 
information through market research, will commit to share this information themselves, 
or hand it over to their retailers knowing that the retailers subsequently will share the 
demand signals. The expected profits to the manufacturers from both scenarios are 
calculated. A comparison shows that the manufacturers always prefer to share 
themselves.
*  I wish to thank Morten Hviid, Kai-Uwe Kiihn, K. Sridhar Moorthy, Louis Phlips 
and Xavier Vives for helpful comments. Financial support from the Danish Research 






















































































































































































This paper analyses information sharing in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly 
which is vertically separated; that is, the two manufacturers sell their products 
through independent retailers. The demand for the two products is stochastic 
and not directly observable to the agents. However, in the main part of the paper 
the manufacturers are assumed to receive private signals about the stochastic 
demand. The literature on information sharing has shown that in the vertically 
integrated version of this model the expected profit of each duopolist will 
increase if the firms (before receiving their signals) commit to sharing their 
private information with their competitor (Vives 1984, Prop. 4). The objective of 
the present analysis is to investigate whether the manufacturers will want to 
share the information themselves or will instead want their retailers to do so.
In the marketing literature the use of retailers and other intermediaries has 
traditionally been attributed to the intermediaries’ having special capabilities for 
performing their functions. In his widely used textbook Philip Ivotler writes; 
“The use of middlemen largely boils down to their superior efficiency in making 
goods widely available and accessible to target markets. Marketing 
intermediaries, through their contacts, experience, specialization, and scale of 
operation, offer the firm more than it can usually achieve on its own” (Kotler 
1988, p. 520). However, recently a number of authors (McGuire and Staelin 
(1983), Bonanno and Vickers (1988), Lin (1988), Moorthy (1988). Couglilau and 
Wernerfelt (1989), and Gal-Or (1990)1 have shown that there may also be a 
strategic motivation for manufacturers’ choosing to distribute their product 
through intermediaries. Even when the manufacturers are equally capable of 
performing the functions of the intermediaries they may choose to delegate tasks 
to independent agents, e.g. retailers. The fundamental idea behind these papers 



























































































since the independent retailer acts as a kind of commitment device. Through the 
contract between manufacturer and retailer a manufacturer can move the 
reaction curves of the retailers in a credible way. Using this possibility in a 
strategic manner can lead to higher profit to the manufacturer than if it 
undertook the retailing task itself.
The question motivating this paper is then: could the same type of reasoning 
apply to the manufacturers’ private information about a stochastic demand 
parameter? As referred to above, in a differentiated Bertrand duopoly model 
there are benefits to each vertically integrated manufacturer from committing to 
share the information. But the results on vertical separation seem to call for 
some reflection on whether the information sharing should take place at the 
manufacturing or at the retailing level if the industry is not vertically integrated. 
The analysis does, however, lead to perhaps the most intuitive answer, that the 
manufacturers will prefer to share the information themselves.
The framework for the analysis is a merger of the vertical separation and the 
information sharing models. The two manufacturers have to choose between an 
upstream or a downstream information sharing arrangement (UISA or DISA) 
before they receive the signals about the stochastic demand. Under the UISA the 
manufacturers share the signals and use the new pooled signal when they 
contract with their retailers. As in the information sharing literature, information 
transmission is assumed to be truthful, both between manufacturer and retailer, 
and between manufacturers (retailers) under the UISA (DISA). Risk-neutral 
retailers will accept contracts which, conditional on the information about 
demand, yield nonnegative expected profits. However, assuming that there is a 
large pool of potential retailers, the expected profits of the two chosen retailers 




























































































arrangement are to be compared with those from the DISA. Under the DISA 
each manufacturer contracts with a retailer on the basis of the manufacturer’s 
private signal (and not the pooled signal, as under UISA). However, the 
manufacturer takes into account that the retailers will share the information and 
hence base their pricing decisions on the pooled signal. When one compares the 
expected profits from the DISA with those from the UISA, the central result of 
the paper emerges: the manufacturers will prefer the UISA over the DISA except 
for two pathological cases when they will be indifferent between the two 
arrangements.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the upstream information 
and Section 3 the downstream information sharing model. In Section 4 the 
profits to the manufacturers from the two institutional arrangements are 
compared and the basic result of the paper is presented. In Section 5 the results 
from a variation of the model are reported: now the retailers get the demand 
signals and there is a large pool of potential manufacturers. The analytics turn 
out to be very similar to those of the main model. Consequently the results are 
also similar: the retailers will always share the information themselves. Finally. 
Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 2
2. Upstream Inform ation Sharing.
The channel structures are fixed and decentralized. That is. each channel 
consists of a manufacturer and an independent retailer. Each of the two goods is 
produced exclusively by a manufacturer. A retailer only sells the goods of one 
manufacturer, as is often (approximately) the case for gasoline stations, car 




























































































demand is assumed to be characterized by linear demand functions,
qj =  a -  bpj + dp2
q2 =  a + dpj -  bp2
where q; is the demand for product 1 when retail prices are p, and p2. By 
assumption a > 0, b > d > 0. When d > 0 the goods are substitutes; when d = 
0 they are independent. Notice that I rule out the possibility of goods being 
complements. The standard assumption of own-elasticities dominating cross­
elasticities (b>d) is made. Since the study focuses on demand information, 
production costs are assumed to be zero. This is equivalent to postulating 
constant (and equal) marginal costs which are then subsumed into the demand 
intercepts such that a is interpreted as net of marginal costs.
The strength of demand is assumed to be unknown to both manufacturers and 
retailers. This is modelled by assuming the intercept a in the demand functions 
to be a stochastic variable whose prior distribution is common knowledge. Let a 
~ N („ ,u>2), where n > 0 while J1 > 0 is finite. Manufacturer i receives an unbiased 
signal of a denoted s*.
s* — a -f"
where ~ N(0,o-2), <r2 finite; cov(ei,f2) =  <r12, 0 < crl2 < a2; and cov(a,c,) =  0.
In this section the manufacturers are committed to communicate their private 
information to a trade association, which collects the data and transmits 
sufficient statistics back to the manufacturers. This is called an upstream 




























































































sharing literature, the analysis concentrates on truthful information transmission. 
Hence, both manufacturers and retailers always tell the truth, whether it is in 
their interest to do so or not. While this certainly leaves aside important issues 
of incentive compatiblity, the assumption may not be as unrealistic as a first 
glance might suggest. Since knowledge about demand often will be gathered 
through research activities (perhaps by outside agencies), such information is 
relatively easy to verify.
The purpose of the information sharing arrangement is to allow better 
predictions of demand and the rival’s price (since in equilibrium the opponent’s 
strategy is known). Given the distributional assumptions above the mean signal s 
=  5 (sf +Sj) is a sufficient statistic for the posterior mean of a, which is the central 
estimator in this section. Cedi this estimator a:
(1) a =  E[a|sjtSy] =  E[a|s] =  ( l-h )p  +  hs
where h =  ., "ri,------
2u> +<r +<ryj
After receiving s each manufacturer contracts with a retailer. Manufacturers and 
retailers are all risk neutral. Hence preference relations are determined entirely in 
terms of expected profits. I assume that the manufacturers have all bargaining 
power. This can be justified by postulating the existence of a pool ol potential 
retailers competing for the right to sell the manufacturers’ products (see e.g. 
Bonanno and Vickers (1988)). As a result the two actual retailers will not receive 
more than their reservation profit levels which are normalized to zero.
The contract between manufacturer and retailer will consist of a wholesale price 




























































































retailers therefore know the value of s. In the next section the contract will 
depend on ŝ , since there the manufacturers do not share their information. As 
argued by Coughlan and Wernerfelt (1989), the wholesale price charged to a 
retailer must be observable to the rival retailer for the strategic effect to work. 
Hence, by assumption . the wholesale prices w,- and wj become common 
knowledge after they have been signed. This assumption is, of course, quite 
heroic, and subject to the criticism of Coughan and Wernerfelt.
The maximization problem of retailer i under upstream information sharing is
max E „{(p ,—w,(s))(a—bpi+dp,') -  f,(s) 
P»
The first order condition gives
— 2bpf +  bw;(s) + E{a|s} +  dp; =  0
Solving this, and using a for E{a|s}, yields equilibrium retailing prices
( 2) Pi(§) =  2ÏÏ=d +  i f c W'(â) + i f e W’ (§)
bd
The corresponding output of firm i is
(3) q,(«) =  ( a - « )  +  2 fT d  -  Jw.-(g) +  jj^ J p w p s ,
while the profit of retailer i will be




























































































The manufacturer will choose w,(s) and fs(g) to maximize its profit subject to the 
constraint that the retailer must earn nonnegative expected profit, conditional on 
s. The manufacturer’s problem is therefore
(4)
max E.{w((s)qj(s) +  f,(s) | s} 
Wi(S),fi(S)
S.t. Ea{ 7T,(s) | S} > 0
As described above, due to the competition from the potential retailers, the 
constraint in (4) will be binding. This allows a reformulation of the problem (4) 
to
max E«{pj(s)q,(s) | s} 
w,-(s)
The first order condition is
(5) E-' + i * ' = »
Conditional on s, the only random element in (5) involves the term (a—a) in (3), 
which in (5) appears in the form Ea{ ^---|yj(a -a ) | s). This is zero since = 
E{a|s}. The remainder of (5) is equivalent to the FOC of the manufacturer s 
problem in a simple deterministic model where the manufacturer chooses w, co 
maximize channel profits. The only difference is that the posterior mean of the 
intercept a is substituted for the actual intercept a. Deriving reaction functions 
from (5) and calculating the equilibrium values of the wholesale prices is then a 
simple exercise:
_____ ad2_____
b(4b2-2 b d -d 2)(6)




























































































Inserting (6) in (2) and (3) gives
Pi(s) 2ab4b2-2 b d —d2
(a—or) + a(2b2—d2) 
4b2-2 b d -d 2
Then f,(s) is found as E0{[pl(s)—w'(s)]qj(s) j s}, since E a ^ fs) J S} =  0.
The first lemma sums up the equilibrium contracts.
Lemma 1. Under the UISA, manufacturer i will, upon receiving the mean signal 
s, offer retailers the contract [w|(s), f|(S)] where
w'(s) _____aif_____b(4b2-2bd -d 2) i  =  1,2
a2(262 —d2)
~ 6(462 — 26d—d2)2 > =  1,2
Notice that, in general, w' =  0 only if d =  0, that is, if the goods are 
independent. In that case there is no strategic gain to the manufactures from 
moving the reaction curve at the retailing level. If d ^  0, w' =  0 only for the 
probability zero event that a =  0.
The resulting expected profit to each manufacturer conditional on the 
observation of s can now easily be found as




























































































m  _  2a2b(2b2- d 2)
1 ’ (4b2—2bd—d2)2
The scenario envisaged in this paper is that manufacturers have to decide before 
receiving their private information whether information will be shared upstream 
or downstream. For this decision the relevant profit expression is not (7) but 
rather the unconditional expected profit E, { Ea { Ml' |s}}. This profit expression is 
the central result of this section and is stated in Lemma 2.
Lemma 2. The expected, profit to each manufacturer from committing to the 
UISA before receiving private information is
E{M'J 2b(2b2-d r)(g 2+ ) ^ )  (4b2-2 b  d-d? P
Proof: E{M'} =  E; {Ea{M'|s}}
2b(2b2—d2) 
(4b2-2 b d —d2):
Es{/i" + 2h/ils-/i) -r h"(s-/i)}
2b(2b2—d2) 
(4b2-21x1—d2)2 [p2 +  h2Var(s)]
2b(2b2—d2)(/j2+hu2) 
(4b2-2 b d -d 2)2





























































































3. Downstream Information Sharing.
In this section the manufacturers do not share their private demand information. 
Hence the contract between manufacturer and retailer will depend on a private 
signal s,-, and not the mean signal s. The retailers learn the signals from the 
manufacturers through the contract and share this information via a trade 
association; hence this is a downstream information sharing arrangement (DISA). 
The manufacturers will take the information sharing among retailers into 
account when the contracts are signed. It is assumed that the retailers can 
observe each other’s contract schedule so that the knowledge of the rival’s signal 
would also give precise information about the wholesale price the rival is paying 
its manufacturer.
That the retailers will share the signals is here an assumption. Some justification 
can be found in Vives (1984) from the result that vertically integrated duopolies 
engaged in Bertrand competition will share demand information. However, this 
does not guarantee that it can be shown that the retailers in this model will 
always share. In fact, it may be hard to formulate a model where this problem 
can be analysed in a satisfactory way.
Another, and perhaps more appealing, interpretation is that the contracts 
become public after they are signed, and that this is taken into account by the 
manufacturers when designing them. When a retailer learns the contract of the 
rival it can infer what the signal has been, and hence knows the value of both the 
rival’s signal and wholesale price. In a way this interpretation may be closer in 
spirit to the literature of vertical separation. However, for brevity of exposition I 
shall stay with the interpretation that retailers actively share information and 




























































































subject to the criticism of Goughian and Wernerfelt (1989) referred to in Section
2.
The manufacturers again have all bargaining power; hence the retailers receive
that information will be shared among the retailers.
The manufacturers’ signals are distributed as described in Section 2. The 
contracts consist of a wholesale price and a franchise fee conditioned on the 
signals s,-, i.e. w^s*) and f,(st). After sharing the signals, the retailers’ common 
posterior estimate of a will be a as in (1). The equilibrium at the retailing level 
will then be determined from the following problem.
zero expected profit conditional on the value of the private signal rind the fact
max E .{(pt- -  w,(sf-))(a -  bpf +  dp ) -  f,(s,) | s}ei
The first order condition gives
— 2bp( 4- bwj(si) +  a + dpj =  0
































































































=  [ p -  *i(*i)]<u(*i,*j) -  f<(s<)
The manufacturer chooses w^s,-) and ft(s,) to maximize its expected profit, 
subject to the constraint that the retailer must earn nonnegative profit 
conditional on s{. Since the manufacturer does not know the rival’s signal when 
proposing the contract, the solution concept is Bayesian-Nash. The expectations 
of a and sj conditional on st are central elements in the manufacturer’s decision:
E{a|sj} =  (l-g)*j +  gs<
E{s,|s,} =  ( l - t ) /l  +  tS,
The manufacturer’s problem is
<7 1 •_
( 10)
max E .,.i {wi(si)qi(sJ,sJ) +  f,(s,) | S;}
WjfsJAls,)
S . t .  E o , . . j { T i ( S j , S J ) | S j }  >  0
As in Section 2 the problem can be reformulated since competition among 
potential retailers makes the constraint in (10) binding:
max Ea,,i{pj(Sj,sJ)qj(si,sJ) | Sj}
W i( S j )
The first order condition is
i 2b2 
'4b2- d :
- [̂(a.-a) + ab _  b(2b2- d 2 
2b—d 4b2—d2 W ,( S j )  +
b2d
4b2—cl2 wj(sj)]
b(2b2- d 2)r 
4b2- d 2 1
a

































































































Call a( =  Ea,«j{a|s,} =  Ea{a|sj}. Then
Eo,*j{a|s,} =  (l-h)/l +  j  Sj +  t  Ea,»j{sj|Sj}




h (l+ t )
~ ~ T ~
The FOC then reduces to
( 11)
bd2*, 4b3(2b2—d2)
(2b—d)(4b2 — d2) (4b2- d 2)2 WilS‘
b2d3
(4b2—d2): E a , J j  { W j ( S j ) ! S , j 0
Equation (11) and its equivalent for firm j can now be solved for w,(s,) and 
Wj(sj) which then in turn can be used to find f,-(s,) and fj(s^):
Lemma 3. Under the DISA, manufacturer i will, upon receiving the private 
signal sit offer retailers the contract [wt(sj), fT(sf)] where
( 12) " f tO  = b(4b7—2bd—d3) + S.'ts, — l‘ )
i (2fc2- r f2) V  , 4(462+ 2 M — d2)2Aui2
tj Is»/ — TTTTt ëëëÿ +6(46 —26d—d2)2 (8b‘ -4bdi - d 3tY
































































































As in Section 2 interest is focused on the unconditional expected profits of the 
manufacturers, since the manufacturers have to decide on the type of 
information sharing arrangement before receiving private information.
Lemma 4 . The expected profit to each manufacturer from committing to the 
DISA before receiving private information is
_  2b(2b2 — d?)p2 b(4b2 +2bd—cP)2h —bd? (4b+3d)g 2
 ̂ ‘  '  -  (4b2-2 b d -t fP  + (8b3-4b<P-t(P)2 “
Proof: E{M+} =  E{pJ'(s<,sJ)qt(8j,sJ)}
=  E {[
2fib
4b2-2 b d -d 2 +
(4b2+ 2 b d -d 2)(S + d2g , 





4b2-2 b d —d2
, b(4b2+ 2 b d -d 2)| -  (b+d)d2g ,
8b3-4b d 2- d 3t (Si "
b(4b2+ 2 b d -d 2)§ , 
8b3-4 b d 2- d 3t
Using that E {(s j- /i)2)} =  w2 +  a1 ; E {(s,-*i)(s^-fj)} =  J1 + *12 and
E{(a—a)(sf —/j) }  =  0, this reduces to
E{M+} b(4b2+ 2 b d -d 2)Ç -  (4b2+ 2 b d -d 2)d3! f  2
(8b3—4bd2—d3t)2 1 +  17 +
(b+d)d4g2 
(8b3—4bd2—d3t)2
(u2 +  a2)




























































































=  gw2. Then Lemma 4 follows immediately.
□
4. Comparison of Profits.
In Sections 2 and 3 the expected profits to the manufacturers from committing 
to upstream and downstream information sharing arrangements were calculated. 
Now these profit expressions are compared to establish the central result of this 
paper.
Proposition. The expected profit to each manufacturer from committing to the 
UISA is never smaller than the expected profit from committing to the DISA. 
Whenever the demand signals are less than perfectly correlated and the goods are 
substitutes, the UISA yields strictly greater expected profit.
Proof: The Proposition is true if and only if
n , 2b(2b2- d 2)hw2  ̂ b(4b2+ 2 b d -d 2)2h -b d 3(4b+3d)g ,
1 1 (4b2—2bd—d2)2 ~ (8b3-4b d 2-td 3)2
Using that g =  both J1, h and g can be eliminated. Define f(t) by
f(t) =  [64b5d3 +  16b4d4 -  64b3d5 -  (8t+4)b2d6 +  16bdT +  (4t-3)ds]t
Then tedious manipulations show that (13) is true if and only if f(t) < f(l) . From 
the definition of t, t e R, =  [ -^ —5 , 1] C [0 , lj. Obviously, if d =  0 f(t) =  f(l)
W ~\~<T
= 0 for all t e R,. Assume d > 0. Then df/dt > 0 for all t r R,. Hence, i'(t) c 





























































































When the goods are independent (d=0) the two arrangements yield the same 
expected profit to the manufacturer. Since there are then no strategic effects, the 
only important issue left is the precision of the signal on which the retail pricing 
decision is made. However, under both arrangements the price is determined on 
the basis of the pooled signal s and is therefore the same. It is equally obvious to 
see that the two arrangements yield equal profits when the signals are perfectly 
correlated (<v12=o-2): information sharing is meaningless since the opponent’s 
signal yields no new information.
The intuition why the manufacturers otherwise want to share the information 
themselves can best be understood by appealing to the results of Vives (1989, 
Lemma 3). He shows that when reaction curves are upward sloping the expected 
profits of a firm increases with the share of its own information that it makes 
available to its rival. Since expected profits are always increasing in the amount 
of information available to a firm itself, it follows that a situation where both 
firms share information must dominate one where they do not share.
The comparison reflected in the Proposition can be interpreted as the result of 
comparing information sharing (UISA) with not sharing (DISA) in a model with 
upward sloping demand functions. Reaction functions are upward sloping, as seen 
from 9w,-/aE0 j-Wj > 0 in (11), since the manufacturers are interested in easing 
the retail level competition by responding positively if the rival sets a higher 
wholesale price. Hence, the Proposition corresponds with the intuition gained 





























































































In this section I will describe an extension of the analysis to a market where the 
retailers, when the terms of the contracts are decided, possess the bargaining 
power assigned to the manufacturers in the previous sections. Furthermore, the 
retailers now receive the demand signals. The objective of this variant of the 
model is to investigate whether it is the position in the chain from manufacturer 
to consumer which determines where the information will be shared, or whether 
it is rather the case that the agents who receive the information will want to 
share it themselves, be they manufacturers or retailers.
From an applied point of view the model in this section is relevant for markets 
where large retailers dominate the relationship with their producers, e.g. because 
the manufacturing process can be performed by several potential producers. An 
example could be large supermarket chains buying products to be sold under rln- 
supermarket’s name.
As the model is very similar to the one presented in the preceding sections I shall 
only describe the set-up and results; interested readers can find the details in 
Chapter 4 in Albaek (1991). Assume that there are two retailers who each 
contract with one manufacturer chosen from a large pool oi potential 
manufacturers. The competition among these potential manufacturer* ensure?' 
that the retailers can extract all profits from their chosen manufactui T; . ia a 
lump sum fee. Hence the two manufacturers in equilibrium receive zero expected 
profits. The demand functions and the stochastic intercept are as described in 
Section 2. However, here the retailers receive the signals and have to decide 
whether to share the information among themselves or pass it on to the 




























































































The contracting between retailers and manufacturers is assumed to take place in 
the following way: the two retailers simultaneously offer contracts [m(, 1J, [m2, 
12] where is the margin that retailer i will take over the wholesale price 
decided by manufacturer i, while lf is a lump sum fee that manufacturer i will 
pay retailer i. The retailers can credibly commit to the margins; hence 
manufacturer i knows that, given mf, a wholesale price of w< will lead to a retail 
price of p,' =  m, + w,. The contracts will depend on the information available to 
the retailers when the contracts are offered. If the retailers share the information 
themselves the contracts will depend on the pooled signal s, while they will be 
functions of the private signals S! and s2 if the retailers leave the information 
sharing to the manufacturers.
Somewhat surprising, it turns out that the analytics of this model are almost 
completely identical to those of Sections 2 and 3. In particular, if the retailers 
share the information themselves their equilibrium expected profits are identical 
to those of the manufacturers in Section 2; if the retailers in this section choose 
not to share information they will receive the same expected profits as the 
manufacturers in Section 3.
The main result from the extension described here must therefore be equivalent 
to the proposition in Section 4: When retailers receive the private demand 
information and competitor! among potential retailers drives the expected profits 
of the manufacturers to zero, the expected profit to each retailer from 
committing to sharing the information themselves is never smaller than the 
expected profit from committing to letting the manufacturers share the 
information. Whenever the demand signals are less than perfectly correlated and 
the goods are substitutes, sharing the information among themselves yields 






























































































This paper has analysed a particular aspect of information transmission in 
vertically separated industries. The central result of the paper is clear: in a 
differentiated Bertrand duopoly model where manufacturers receive private 
demand information, they get higher profits from upstream than from 
downstream information sharing. Thus they should share their information 
themselves, rather than pass it on to their retailers in the knowledge that they 
will share it. The paper thus predicts that under these circumstances one should 
expect to find that trade associations acting as information sharing devices 
proliferate at the manufacturing rather than at the retailing level. The variation 
in Section 5 clarifies the origin of this result: in the main model it is the fact that 
the manufacturers receive the information which allows the prediction that the 
manufacturers will share the information. In the model in Section 5 tlu* retailer? 
receive the signals and the analysis shows that they will then share the 
information themselves. Thus, if information sharing is beneficial the agents wuo 
receive the information will share it. They will not pass it on to other channel 
members in the hope that the competition conditional on the information will be 
eased.
The information structure of the model is quite special. It is most adequate for 
products where manufacturers sell through retailers in a number of (separate) 
local markets, but where the variations in demand from market to market are 
quite small. Hence, in the main model the manufacturers support research on the 




























































































markets is relatively unimportant when contracts are negotiated.
Recently, other authors have taken the opposite approach to the question of 
vertical restraints with incomplete information. Rey and Tirole (1986) assume 
that retailers through their local knowledge will possess superior information 
about the economic environment. However, this knowledge is acquired after the 
contracts are signed. Hence, the relationship between manufacturer and.'retailer 
is analysed as an agency problem where manufacturers choose contracts in a way 
that maximizes their expected profits under the constraint that the contract 
must offer retailers nonnegative (ex ante) expected utility (retailers may be risk 
averse in their analysis). Gal-Or (1988) assumes, in an informational set-up 
similar to that of Rey and Tirole, that retailers must earn nonnegative profits for 
every state of nature. In her model, first manufacturers choose either a franchise 
fee arrangement or a retail price maintenance scheme. In both cases terms of 
trade will depend on the state of nature. Next the retailer learns the state of 
nature and communicates this to the manufacturer. In order that the retailer will 
report the true state of nature, the contracts must satisfy certain incentive 
compatibility constraints.
The flow of information between manufacturers and their retailers is a 
fascinating object for study. In general, both parties will possess information 
which is valuable to the other, and which ought to influence their contract. The 
manufacturer will possess information about the product itself and estimates of 
the general state of demand for the product. However, the retailer will have 
superior knowledge of the local market. At the same time, both manufacturers 
and retailers may have incentives to communicate their information to their 
competitors. Much work needs to be done in order to enhance our understanding 




























































































Appendix: Proof of Lemma 3.
Basar (1978) has shown that the unique Bayesian equilibrium in this type of 
model consists of strategies affine in the private signals sf and Sy (see his 
Theorem 3). Therefore, assume that manufacturer j ’s strategy is affine in the 
signal Sj:
Then
wAsi) =  A .i +  Bts;
E .i {w i (sj )|sj }  =  A ;- +  B jE , j {S j |Si} =  Ay +  B y (l -t )^  +  BytSj
Substitute this and (1) into (11) to get
(A l) d 2(2 b + d ) ( l -g )^  d2(2 b + d )g  d aA ,
J  4 b 2(2b2- d 2) 4b2(2b2- d 2) ’ ' 4b (2 b 2- d 2)
d3B J( l - t ) /. d % t
4b (2b2—d 2) 4b (2b2—d 2)
Since manufacturer i’s strategy is also affine, it follows from (A l) that
(A 2)
(A3)
d 2(2 b + d ) ( l -g )^  +  bd 3B ; ( l - t ) / i  +  b d :iA 3 
4b2(2 b2- d 2)
bd 3Byt d2(2 b + d )g
4b2(2 b2- d 2) +  4b2(2 bz—d 2)
Inserting the symmetrical expression for B,- in (A3) gives the expression for B, in 
Lemma 3. Using this in (A2), and the symmetry of A,- and Ay, leads after tedious 
manipulations to
A ( = d2u





























































































This result conforms with the type of decision strategies described by Basar. 
Inserting (23) in (8) and (9) gives
(A4) 2/ib , (4b2+ 2 b d -d 2)§ +  d2g , ^
4b2-2bd-d2 +  8b3-4 b d 2- d 3t
, (4b2+ 2 b d -d 2)ji , ,
+  8b3-4 b d 2- d 3t (Sj-/0
(A5)  ̂ (2b2- d 2)p ,
b(4b2+ 2 b d -d 2)§ -  (b+d)d2g 
8b3-4 b d 2- d 3t
b(4b2+2bd—d2)§ 
8b3-4 b d 2- d 3t"
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